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Analysis	of	Differential	Phase	Shift	Quantum	Key	Distribution		
 
MONICA LAVALE 
 
Abstract: 
We review the implementation of two QKD protocols (BB84 and B92) keeping in mind that 
their implementations do not easily satisfy the requirement of use of single photons. We argue 
that current models do not take into account issues raised by the Uncertainty Principle related to 
time-location and transmission characteristics of single photons. This indicates that security 
proofs of current implementations even after the fixes for the recent successful hacks are made 
will be hard to obtain. 
 
Introduction 
Quantum computing provides procedures to solve computationally inefficient problems like 
prime factorization [3], database search [4], and cryptography, that is Quantum cryptography 
based  key distribution (QKD) exploits the quantum properties of photons [1],[2],[5] and, in 
theory, provides a way of transmission of information in an unconditionally secure way over a 
network. There exist various types of QKD protocols (BB84[1], B92[2], Kak06 [5],[10]) that 
describe the optical apparatus to be used for encoding and decoding information in photons. 
 
Classically, the one-time pad is the only unconditionally secure protocol of transmitting secret 
messages; however it has significant overhead when it comes to distributing the key to the 
receiver. A trusted courier is required to deliver the key to the receiver every time a message 
needs to be sent to the receiver. In addition, the key has to be of the same length as of the 
message and should not be reused to encrypt any other message in order to ensure the 
unconditional security of the algorithm. Quantum cryptography provides an entirely different 
solution to the cryptography problem by coding information in the form of states of photons that 
can be transmitted in an unconditionally secure way to the intended receiver. In quantum key 
distribution, quantum communication is used to exchange the key which is then used to encrypt 
the text message over a classical channel.  
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is the bright reference pulse; and the pulse which passes through the long arm of the 
interferometer is the weak signal pulse. This weak signal pulse is phase shifted by either 0˚ or 
180˚, meaning information 0 and 1 respectively. The signal pulse and reference pulse are 
separated in time and the difference in their time is ∆t. These encoded pulses are passed through 
an optical fiber to the other end where Bob receives the pulses and passes them through another 
interferometer. Since Bob has two pulses, each pulse is further split into two more pulses by the 
beam splitter. The detector connected to the interferometer detects pulses in three time slots. In 
the following sections, we cover all possibilities of phase shifting by Alice and measurement 
basis used by Bob. Since B92 uses only two non-orthogonal bases, there could be 4 possibilities: 
 
1. Alice encodes bit 0 in photon state by using a phase shift of 0˚; and Bob’s measurement basis 
is correct, i.e., a phase shift of 0˚ in his apparatus. The schematic of the apparatus is shown in 
Figure 2.1 (a). 
 
Figure 2.1 (a): Phase shift by Alice is 0˚ and phase shift by Bob is also 0˚. BS: Beam Splitter; 
M: Mirror 
 
Figure 2.1 (b) shows the waveforms of pulses occurring throughout the apparatus. The pulses 
in time slot t2 cause constructive interference and results in a strong pulse shown in bold. The 
detector would measure the phase of this pulse and conclude that the information encoded in 
0. 
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Figure 2.1 (b): Waveforms of pulses throughout the apparatus of Figure 2.1 (a) 
 
2. The second case is that Alice encodes bit 0 in photon state by using a phase shift of 0˚; and 
Bob’s measurement basis is incorrect, i.e., a phase shift of 180˚ in his apparatus. The 
schematic of the apparatus is shown in Figure 2.2 (a). 
 
Figure 2.2 (a): Phase shift by Alice is 0˚ and phase shift by Bob is 180˚. BS: Beam Splitter; M: Mirror 
 
Figure 2.2 (b) shows the waveforms of pulses occurring throughout the apparatus. The pulses 
in time slot t2 cause destructive interference and hence no pulse is observed at the detector. 
This would signify that the measurement basis was wrong because of which information 
encoded is lost and we cannot conclude if that information was 0 or 1. 
     ∆t    
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Figure 2.2 (b): Waveforms of pulses throughout the apparatus in Figure 2.2 (a) 
 
3. The third case is that Alice encodes bit 1 in photon state by using a phase shift of 180˚; and 
Bob’s measurement basis is correct, i.e., a phase shift of 180˚ in his apparatus. The schematic 
of the apparatus is shown in Figure 2.3 (a). 
 
Figure 2.3 (a): Phase shift by Alice is 180˚ and phase shift by Bob is 180˚. BS: Beam Splitter; M: 
Mirror 
 
Figure 2.3 (b) shows the waveforms of pulses occurring throughout the apparatus. The pulses 
in time slot t2 are both phase shifted by 180˚ causing constructive interference and hence a 
strong pulse is observed at the detector. The detector measures the phase of the photon and 
we conclude that the information encoded was 1. 
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Figure 2.3 (b): Waveforms of pulses throughout the apparatus in Figure 2.3 (a) 
 
4. The fourth case is that Alice encodes bit 1 in photon state by using a phase shift of 180˚; and 
Bob’s measurement basis is incorrect, i.e., a phase shift of 0˚ in his apparatus. The schematic 
of the apparatus is shown in Figure 2.4 (a). 
 
Figure 2.4 (a): Phase shift by Alice is 180˚ and phase shift by Bob is 0˚. BS: Beam Splitter; M: Mirror 
 
The waveforms of pulses occurring throughout the apparatus are same as shown in Figure 2.2 
(b). The pulses in time slot t2 cause destructive interference and hence no pulse is observed at 
the detector. This would signify that the measurement basis was wrong because of which 
information encoded is lost and we cannot conclude if that information was 0 or 1. 
 
In this way, by observing the reading of detector in the time slot t2, Bob informs Alice of the 
instances where he got correct results. Alice and Bob can then conclude to keep these bits as 
their key bits and discard all other bits. Table 1 shows the preparation basis and encoded values 
transmitted by Alice and the measurement basis used by Bob. 
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Implementation Challenges 
There are several challenges to the implementation of the apparatus for the encoding and 
transmitting photons. The first and important challenge is to design a single photon generator 
without which the system is prone to PNS attack. Although there is some progress in developing 
single photon generator that can be put in use for optical telecommunication [3],[7], the current 
engineering practice fall much short of perfect single photon sources [6].  
 
The implementations by MagiQ and idQuantique use very low intensity pulses so that on an 
average there is a fraction of a single photon in one time slot. Nevertheless, the transmission will 
bunch several photons together in a Poisson distribution. Because of the fact that polarization 
states drift in optical fiber, the implementations use quantum phase modulation. When several 
photons are being transmitted instead of one, it is easier to find out the phase of the transmitted 
pulse. The industry implementations of BB84 and B92 protocols have recently been hacked 
[8],[9]. This suggests that the assumption that a very low power laser which implies a mean of a 
fraction of a single photon per unit of time does not provide sufficient security. The question of 
how this loss of security relates to the manner in which photons are detected with the assumption 
that their number follows the Poisson distribution needs to be worked out. 
 
The other issue is that of noise. Even if single-photon sources existed, their use will be rendered 
ineffective by the fact that background noise requires that the signal strength be greater than it. 
Unless there is no background noise at all, one would be compelled to use several photons in the 
transmission which would then render the communication open to PNS attack. On the other 
hand, if a certifiably shielded, noise-free cable existed then there is no need for the use of 
quantum cryptography. 
 
Another challenge is the transmission channel. If the photons were to be transmitted over fiber 
optics channel, the transmission length would be limited to about 100 km which is very less 
considering today’s long distance communications. For lengths more than that, the photons 
would tend to change their phase because of constant reflections from inner coatings of fiber 
optics cable, and hence the information which was encoded in it would degrade. Since photon is 
the smallest quantum mechanical particle, it is very difficult to isolate it completely from the 
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surrounding environment. This would obstruct its transmission over a wireless network since 
photons from the surrounding environment would interfere and cause some error in the 
information that the photon contains. Because of these reasons, practical implementations of the 
QKD protocols are limited to transmission over a few tens of kilometers; and still have the 
security hole for PNS attacks [4],[8],[9]. 
 
Conclusions 
The apparatus of Figure 1, which is basic to the implementation of the B92 protocol, will also 
work for optical communication in the classical regime. This indicates that unless the signal 
source is certifiably quantum, the system can be considered to be classical and, therefore, subject 
to easy compromise. This leaves the Kak06 protocol as the most promising quantum 
cryptography protocol at this time [10] since it is more resistant to siphoning attacks compared to 
the other protocols. The robustness of the Kak06 protocol is due to the fact that Alice and Bob 
can use different polarization rotations on each qubit and, therefore, even if more than one 
photon is being transmitted for each qubit, Eve cannot use the information to break the code. The 
man-in-the-middle attack can be foiled by the use of trusted certificates [13]. 
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